R2DS Île-de-France

Réseau de Recherche sur le Développement Soutenable


Avril 2015

Lundi 13 avril

COP21, quel leadership pour la France ?

Une intervention de Teresa Ribera dans le cadre d’une conférence organisée par Toute l’Europe (portail français d’information sur les questions européennes) à l’Assemblée nationale.

Cette conférence a pour objectif de présenter les enjeux de la COP21 dans le cadre de la lutte contre le changement climatique.

Teresa Ribera intervient lors de la 2e table ronde, « L’aide au développement, vecteur de lutte contre le changement climatique ? », aux côtés d’Annick Girardin (secrétaire d’État au Développement et à la Francophonie) et Frédéric Roussel (cofondateur d’ACTED et membre du comité exécutif de Convergences).

Le site de Toute l’Europe

Jeudi 16 Avril

Paris Environmental and Energy Economics Seminar


The two speakers are Olli Tahvonen (University of Helsinki) and Basak Bayramoglu (INRA - UMR Economie Publique)

Olli Tahvonen (University of Helsinki)

"Economics of naturally regenerating, heterogeneous forests : goodbye to Martin Faustmann ?"

Abstract :

An economic model for naturally regenerating, heterogeneous forests is specified to yield both clearcuts and continuous cover forestry endogenously. The model includes nonconvexities and any number of state variables but is, in its simplest form, a one-state variable problem. Clearcuts with various rotation lengths and continuous harvesting appear as locally optimal solutions. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the local and global optimality of these two forest management types are obtained. Discounting is found to increase rotation length and to favor continuous harvesting. Initial state may determine the optimality of continuous forest cover versus clearcuts. The relative value of large trees is an important factor in the optimality of different solutions. Analytical results are demonstrated by an empirical application.

Basak Bayramoglu (INRA - UMR Economie Publique) joint with Brian R. Copeland and Jean-François Jacques

"Trade and fisheries subsidies"

Abstract :

World Trade Organization members included fishery subsidies in the Doha round of trade negotiations. This paper develops a simple model to show why prospects for a deal on fisheries subsidies may be difficult. To focus on trade issues, we consider fisheries that do not fall under the jurisdiction of more than one country. Typically governments using subsidies find themselves in a Prisoner’s dilemma. If two countries use subsidies to promote employment in some sector, then one country’s subsidy will push down the world price, undermining the other country’s attempt to promote its output. This creates incentives to negotiate to curtail subsidies. These incentives may not exist in fisheries for 3 reasons. First, if fisheries are severely depleted, one country’s subsidy reduces its long run supply of fish, raising prices and benefiting other fish exporting countries. Hence the usual Prisoner’s Dilemma does not exist. Second, if governments use other policies (such as season closures) to control fish stocks, then changes in subsidies may not affect harvests and hence may not generate international spillover effects. And third, even if governments were compelled to reduce fishery subsidies, there may be little real effect because governments would be motivated to weaken other regulations targeting the fish sector.

Jeudi 16 avril de 16h30 à 18h30

Maison des Sciences Economiques
106-112 boulevard de l’Hôpital
75013 Paris.

Pour télécharger le programme cliquez ici